Chapter 03Editorial orientation · Not expert-reviewedReading-list orientation

Scepticism, relativity, and liberation: Cārvāka, Buddhism & Jain Anekāntavāda

Classical India, c. 500 BCE to c. 500 CE

Core idea: The heterodox (nāstika) traditions rejected Vedic scriptural authority to propose alternative ontologies: radical empirical materialism (Cārvāka), universal impermanence and non-self (Buddhism), and the many-sidedness of reality (Jainism).

Structural diagram

Structural Model

Heterodox Models: Dependent Origination & Anekāntavāda (c. 500 BCE–500 CE)

The Buddhist dynamic causal chain and the Jain seven-fold perspectival logic.

BUDDHIST PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDAAniccaImpermanenceŚūnyatāEmptinessAnattāNo Eternal SelfCauses & conditions in continuous fluxJAIN ANEKĀNTAVĀDA & SYĀDVĀDA1. Syād-asti: In a sense, it is2. Syān-nāsti: In a sense, it is not3. Syād-asti-nāsti: In a sense, it is and is not4. Syād-avaktavyaḥ: In a sense, it is inexpressibleEpistemic humility

Ancient Indian philosophy was not a monolithic theological system. Alongside the orthodox schools that revered Vedic authority, a vibrant constellation of heterodox (nāstika) systems emerged that challenged metaphysical dogmas, sacrificial rituals, and caste hierarchies.1

These traditions — notably Cārvāka/Lokāyata (materialist scepticism), Buddhism (phenomenology of non-self), and Jainism (multi-perspectival non-absolutism) — enriched subcontinental thought with enduring tools of critical inquiry.

Cārvāka / Lokāyata: The radical empirical sceptics

The Cārvāka (or Lokāyata, “philosophy of the people”) school represented a radical form of rational scepticism:

  • Strict Empiricism: They accepted only direct perception (pratyakṣa) as a valid instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa), arguing that inference (anumāna) cannot guarantee unconditioned universal truths because unperceived factors may always intervene.2
  • Materialist Ontology: They maintained that consciousness arises from the specific combination of four physical elements (earth, water, fire, air), just as the intoxicating power of wine emerges from the fermentation of non-intoxicating ingredients.3
  • Ethics of the Present: Rejecting rebirth, karma, heaven, and ritual sacrifices, they urged humans to live joyfully in the present physical world without submitting to priestly exploitation.

Buddhism: Impermanence, Dependent Origination, and Non-Self

Siddhārtha Gautama (the Buddha) presented a therapeutic philosophy aimed at dismantling human suffering (duḥkha):

  1. Anicca (Universal Impermanence): All conditioned things are in a perpetual state of dynamic flux; there are no static, eternal substances.4
  2. Pratītyasamutpāda (Dependent Origination): Every phenomenon arises dependent on causes and conditions (When this exists, that comes to be; … with the cessation of this, that ceases).
  3. Anattā (No-Self): The human being is not an unchanging, eternal soul (Ātman), but an ever-shifting stream of five psycho-physical aggregates (skandhas): form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness.5

Later, the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 2nd century CE) founded the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school, demonstrating that because all things arise interdependently, they are empty (śūnya) of intrinsic, independent essence (svabhāva).6

Jainism: Anekāntavāda

Jain philosophy developed a pluralistic epistemology:

  • Anekāntavāda (Non-Absolutism / Many-Sidedness of Reality): Truth is complex and multidimensional. No single human perspective can grasp the totality of truth; every statement expresses a partial viewpoint (naya).7
  • Syādvāda (The Seven-Fold Conditional Predication): To prevent dogmatic certainty, every assertion should be qualified with the prefix Syāt (“in a certain sense” or “from a given perspective”):
    1. In a sense, it is.
    2. In a sense, it is not.
    3. In a sense, it is both.
    4. In a sense, it is inexpressible.
    5. In a sense, it is, and is inexpressible.
    6. In a sense, it is not, and is inexpressible.
    7. In a sense, it is, is not, and is inexpressible.8

Some interpreters link this epistemology to the ethical doctrine of Ahiṃsā (Universal Non-Violence): recognising that an opponent’s perspective holds partial truth discourages dogmatism.

Four terms to carry forward

Term Working meaning in this chapter
Cārvāka Ancient Indian empirical materialism and scepticism rejecting unobservable entities.
Pratītyasamutpāda The Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination: all things arise conditionally.
Anattā The Buddhist insight that no permanent, independent self (ātman) exists.
Anekāntavāda The Jain doctrine that reality is multifaceted, so that any single standpoint (naya) grasps only part of it.

What this chapter does not claim

  1. That Cārvāka was merely hedonistic debauchery; the surviving fragments, together with the reports of their critics, show a sophisticated critique of epistemic inductivism.
  2. That Buddhism’s “emptiness” (śūnyatā) is nihilism; it is an affirmation of relational interdependence, not non-existence.
  3. That Jain non-absolutism means subjective nihilism; it asserts that objective reality exists, but our descriptions are inevitably conditioned.
  4. That ancient heterodox thinkers lived in total harmony; debates between Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu scholars were fierce, prolonged, and highly competitive.

Sources and further reading

Version 0.3 · September 2026 · Editorial orientation · Reading list provided · Not expert-reviewed. Corrected after an editorial audit in September 2026.

Footnotes

  1. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (George Allen & Unwin, 1932 / Motilal Banarsidass, 2005).

  2. B.K. Matilal, Logical and Ethical Issues of Religious Belief (University of Calcutta, 1982).

  3. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism (People’s Publishing House, 1959); Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III (Cambridge University Press, 1940).

  4. Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism (Oxford University Press, 1998).

  5. Saṃyutta Nikāya XXII.59 (Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta); translation in Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (Wisdom Publications, 2000).

  6. Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Oxford University Press, 1995).

  7. Bimal Krishna Matilal, The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-vāda) (L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1981).

  8. Satkari Mookerjee, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism (Bharati Mahavidyalaya, 1944; Motilal Banarsidass, 1978).

Living Term